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Abstract
This paper presents an overview of some of the most important decisions handed down by the 
Delaware Supreme Court　and the Delaware Court of Chancery from July 2017 to December 2017 in 
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I. Introduction:
　　　Since 2002, Delaware had consistently occupied the top rank in the Lawsuit Climate Survey 
periodically conducted by the U.S. Chamber for Legal Reform. However, in the Survey conducted in 
September 2017, Delaware fell precipitously to 11th place.1 There have been various conjectures about 
the reason for the decline. One conjecture is that it is the consequence of the newly enacted legislative 
prohibition on fee-shifting provisions.2 Another is that it is the result of other states having enacted legal 
reforms to make the environment more business-friendly.3
　　　This comes against the backdrop of a sharp drop in merger challenges filed in Delaware courts in 
recent years, at least partly as a consequence of the Delaware Court of Chancery’s 2016 decision in In 
re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation,4 the Delaware Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Corwin v. KKR 
Financial Holdings LLC,5 and the Delaware Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in C&J Energy Services, Inc. 
v. City of Miami General Employees’ and Sanitation Employees’ Retirement Trust .6 The Trulia decision 
was one of the factors that sparked a big increase in merger-related litigation in federal courts in 2017. 
　　　Notwithstanding these developments, because of the experience and expertise of the Delaware 
Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court in corporate litigation, the cachet of the decisions 
issued by the two courts in corporate law matters remains undiminished. Following is a brief overview 
of the decisions issued by the Delaware courts in Merger & Acquisition cases in the period between July 
2017 and December 2017.  
　　　
II. A brief overview of significant Merger and Acquisition cases decided by the Delaware Courts in the 
second half of 2017:
　　　1.  ACP Master Ltd., et al., v. Sprint Corporation, et al.:7
　　　The case arose out of a merger whereby Sprint Corporation, a majority stockholder 
of Clearwire Corporation, acquired 49.8% of Clearwire’s equity at $5.00 per share. Sprint had earlier 
1  See: U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, 2017 LAWSUIT CLIMATE SURVEY, Ranking the States: A 
Survey of the Fairness and Reasonableness of State Liability Systems, September 2017. The Survey seeks 
to quantify the perceptions of corporate attorneys regarding various issues, including the impartiality and 
competence of trial judges and how good the judicial review is. Available at: https://www.instituteforleg-
alreform.com/uploads/pdfs/Harris-2017-Executive-Summary-FINAL.pdf.  
2  Sections 102 (f) and 109 (b) of the Delaware General Corporation Law became effective on August 1, 2015. 
These provisions prohibit corporate documents from subjecting a shareholder to attorney fees or expenses 
of the corporation or any third party in relation to a Section 115 “internal corporate claim.” There were 
also other significant amendments to the DGCL in 2017, authorizing the use of “blockchain technology,” 
and making mergers between Delaware and non-Delaware corporations easier.
3  It will be useful to note here by way of background that 2017 was a banner year for M&A activity world-
wide. The final quarter of the year was particularly strong with some of the largest M&A deals of 2017 
having been announced in the last two months of that year. Among the reasons for this are thought to be 
the booming stock market and the low interest rates. 
4  In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation. Opinion available at: https://courts.delaware.gov/opinions/down-
load.aspx?ID=235370 .  The Court of Chancery here ruled that disclosure-only settlements would be sub-
jected to much greater judicial scrutiny than they had been in in the past. 
5  Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC. 125 A.3d 304 (Del.2015).
6  C&J Energy Services, Inc. v. City of Miami General Employees’ and Sanitation Employees’ Retirement 
Trust. 107 A.3d 1049. (Del.2014).
7  ACP Master Ltd., et al., v. Sprint Corporation et al. C.A. No.8508-VCL.; ACP Master Ltd., et al., v. Clear-
wire Corporation. C.A. No. 9042-VCL.  Decided by the Court of Chancery of the Court of Delaware on 
July 21, 2017. Memorandum Opinion, available at: https://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.
aspx?id=259730. Corrected on August 8, 2017. Available at: https://www.courts.delaware.gov/Opin-
ions/Download.aspx?id=260500.  
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offered to pay $2.97 per share, but in view of considerable shareholder opposition and a subsequent higher 
bid by a competitor, negotiations ensued and the price of $5.00 per share was agreed upon. The petitioners 
in the present case were shareholders of Clearwire who had dissented against the merger. In the lawsuit, 
the petitioners alleged that Sprint had committed breaches of fiduciary duty – aided and abetted by 
Softbank, which had acquired a majority shareholding of Sprint. The petitioners also sought an appraisal 
of their shares. 
　　　On the assumption that Sprint was the controlling stockholder of Clearwire, the Court applied the 
“entire fairness” standard of review.8  The Court held that in spite of certain events in the early stages of 
the merger transaction process,　in view of the stockholders’ opposition to Sprint’s initial offer and the 
subsequent bidding war with a competitor, the consequent merger price and process had been entirely 
fair. 
　　　On the question of valuation, the Court used a discounted cash flow analysis which was consonant 
with the approach taken by the experts of the opposing parties in the case. The figures arrived at by the 
opposing experts, however, revealed a huge discrepancy. The petitioners’ expert computed a figure of 
$16.08 per share, whereas Sprint’s expert computed a figure of $2.13 per share. The Court accepted the 
DCF analysis of Sprint’s expert and concluded that Clearwire Corporation’s fair value was $ 2.13 per 
share, which was considerably less than the merger price of $ 5.00 per share. The Court thereby concluded 
that: “The defendants proved for purposed of the fiduciary analysis that the Clearwire-Sprint Merger was 
entirely fair. They also proved for purposes of the appraisal proceeding that the fair value of Clearwire on 
the closing date was $ 2.13 per share.”9 The Court also ruled in the favor of Softbank on petitioners’ claim 
regarding aiding and abetting. 
　　　The Court’s opinion in this case is significant inasmuch as it being the second time in 2017 that the 
Court had determined the fair value as being considerably lower than the merger price.10 This should give 
pause to shareholders weighing the practical implications of seeking appraisal in merger cases.
　　　2.  In re Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. Shareholders Litigation:11
　　　In this case, the Court considered the ramifications of the decision in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide12 as 
8   The “entire fairness” standard is an exacting standard that requires the Court to determine that the trans-
action is fair in respect of both process and price. See generally: Krasner v. Moffet, 826 A.2d 277 (Del.2003), 
Texlon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257 (Del. 2002), Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del.1983), In 
re. TD Banknorth Shareholders Litigation, 938 A.2d 654 (Del.Ch.2007), Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, 663 
A.2d at 1162 (Del.1995), Valeant Pharm.Int’l v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732 (Del.Ch.2007).
9   Supra note 7, at internal page 95 of the Court’s Opinion.
10  The first such case was In re Appraisal of SWS Group, Inc. C.A. No. 10554-VCG, 2017 WL 2334852 (Del.
Ch.May 30,2017). Available at: https://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=257320. 
11  In re Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. Shareholders Litigation. Consolidated C.A. No. 11202-VCS. 
Decided by the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware on August 18, 2017. Opinion, available at: 
https://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=260830.
12  Kahn v. M&F Worldwide, 88 A.3d 635 (Del.2014). No. 334, 2013. Court Below – Court of Chancery of the 
State of Delaware C.A. No. 6566. Decided by the Supreme Court of Delaware on March 14, 2013. Opinion 
available at:https://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=202790 .
    The Supreme Court of Delaware stated (at internal page 18 of the Opinion): 
 
To summarize our holding, in controller buyouts, the business 
judgment standard of review will be applied if and only if : (i) the
controller conditions the procession of the transaction on the
approval of both a Special Committee and a majority of the minority
stockholders; (ii) the Special Committee is independent; (iii) the
Special Committee is empowered to freely select its own advisors and
to say no definitively; (iv) the Special Committee meets its duty of 
care in negotiating a fair price; (v) the vote of the minority is informed;
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they relate to transactions the Court termed “conflicted one-side controller transactions.”13 
　　　The plaintiffs were former stockholders of Martha Stewart Omnimedia Company which was sold to 
a third party buyer. The plaintiffs filed suit against the former controlling shareholder Martha Stewart, 
alleging breaches of fiduciary duties relating to the sale and against the buyer, alleging aiding and 
abetting of the breaches. The plaintiffs contended that the controlling shareholder had taken advantage 
of her position to obtain a higher consideration for herself as compared to the other stockholders and that 
the transaction was subject to the entire fairness standard of review. The Defendants filed a motion to 
dismiss. 
　　　The Court here considered whether the Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling in Kahn v. M&F 
Worldwide  which applied in the case of a squeeze-out merger, would also apply in a case such as this 
where the controlling stockholder was the seller and an independent third party was the buyer. On the 
facts of the case, the Court was required to determine at the outset what the applicable standard of 
review would be. The Court set it out thus:
In this case, the question has two parts: (1) whether Plaintiffs
have pled facts that allow a reasonable inference that Stewart
engaged in a conflicted transaction; and if so, (2) whether
Plaintiffs have pled facts that allow a reasonable inference that
the dual procedural protections employed in connection with this
transaction fell short of what is required under Delaware law to
justify business judgment review of Plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary
duty claim at the pleadings stage.14
        The Court ruled that abiding with the procedural safeguards adumbrated in M&F Worldwide 
would protect a controlling stockholder in a case such as this from allegations of conflicts of interest 
due to payment of disparate consideration and resultant claims of breaches of fiduciary duties. Upon a 
considered assessment of the plaintiffs’ claims, the Court ruled that the breach of fiduciary duties claim 
against the controlling stockholder was subject to the business judgment standard of review and that the 
transaction could only be challenged on the ground of waste, which claim the plaintiffs had not made. The 
Court here reiterated its deference to decisions that were the result of an adherence to Court-sanctioned 
procedural safeguards that led to fair outcomes. On that basis, the defendants’ motion to dismiss was 
granted by the Court. 
　　　3.  Richard L. Salberg and David Pinkoski v. Genworth Financial, Inc.:15
　　　In this case, the Delaware Court of Chancery considered the practical application of the Garner 
and (vi) there is no coercion of the minority.
(Internal footnote omitted.)
13  In re Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. Shareholders Litigation. Supra note 11, at internal page 3 
of the Court’s Opinion. 
14  In re Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. Shareholders Litigation. Supra note 11, at internal page 5 
of the Court’s Opinion. 
15  Richard L. Salberg and David Pinkoski v. Genworth Financial, Inc.
    C.A.No.2017-0018-JRS. Decided by the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware on July 27, 2017. Mem-
orandum Opinion, available at: https://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=260030. 
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exception16 to the attorney-client privilege in the context of a Section 220 demand.17 The plaintiffs had 
filed a derivative action alleging breaches of fiduciary duties on the part of the directors and some officers 
of the defendant Corporation. While the derivative action was still pending, the defendant Corporation 
announced that it was to be acquired by another corporation. The plaintiffs sought documents under 
Section 220 to examine whether the valuation of the pending derivative claims had been factored into 
the consideration for the merger. Upon a detailed consideration of all the facts in the case, as well as the 
Delaware Rule of Evidence Section 502 (b) regarding attorney-client privilege and the decision of the 
Delaware Supreme Court in the Wal-Mart case18, the Court refused to apply the Garner exception even 
though the Plaintiffs’ Section 220 demand had arguably satisfied the grounds that constituted “good 
cause.” In doing so, the Court set out clearly that the application of the Garner exception was fact-specific 
and entirely within the Court’s discretion. On that basis, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ Section 220 
demand.
　　　4.  DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners L.P .:19
　　　This case involved the acquisition of DFC Global Corporation (DFCG) by a private equity buyer 
following a two-year sale process at the deal price of $ 9.50 per share. Upon an appraisal action being 
filed certain stockholders of DFCG, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that although the sale process 
had been open, robust, and competitive, the deal price could not be the sole determinant of fair value, 
16  Under the Garner exception, a stockholder has a right to access certain privileged documents of a company 
provided a “good cause” can be demonstrated. The existence of a “good cause” was to be determined on the 
basis of an evaluation of numerous factors set out in the Court’s opinion. See: Garner v. Wolfinbarger,  430 
F.2d 1093, 1104 (5th Cir.1970). The Garner exception was adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Indiana Elec.Workers Pension Tr.Fund, 95 A.3d 1264, 1278 (Del.2014). 
17  Section 220 (b) of the Delaware General Corporation law provides as follows:
220 
…
(b) Any stockholder, in person or by attorney or other agent, shall,
upon written demand under oath stating the purpose thereof, have 
the right during the usual hours for business to inspect for any
proper purpose, and to make copies and extracts from:
(1)  The corporation’s stock ledger, a list of its stockholders, and
its other books and records; and
(2)  A subsidiary’s books and records, to the extent that:
a.    The corporation has actual possession and control of such
records of such subsidiary; or
b.    The corporation could obtain such records through the 
exercise of control over such subsidiary, provided that as
of the date of the making of the demand:
1 The stockholder inspection of such books and records of 
the subsidiary would not constitute a breach of an 
agreement between the corporation or the subsidiary and 
a person or persons not affiliated with the corporation, and
2. The subsidiary would not have the right under the law 
applicable to it to deny the corporation access to such books
and records upon demand by the corporation.
   
…
    (Title 8, Chapter 1, General Corporation Law. Available at: http://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c001/sc07/. 
18  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Indiana Elec.Workers Pension Tr.Fund, 95 A.3d 1264 (Del.2014). 
19  DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners L.P . No.518, 2016. C.A. No. 10107. Decided by the Supreme 
Court of the State of Delaware on August 1, 2017. Opinion, available at: https://courts.delaware.gov/Opin-
ions/Download.aspx?id=260240. 
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because of a private equity buyer’s inherent business constraints and also uncertainty regarding possible 
heightened regulatory stringency over the industry in which DFCG functioned. In determining the fair 
value, the Delaware Court of Chancery used an amalgam of the deal price, a revised Discounted Cash 
Flow Analysis, and a Comparable Companies Analysis, giving equal weight to all three metrics. After 
further adjustments, the Chancery Court arrived at a final figure of $ 10.30 per share as the fair value of 
DFCG’s shares.
     On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that the Court of Chancery’s has broad discretion to make 
findings of fact, but that “those findings of fact have to be grounded in the record and reliable principles 
of corporate finance and economics.”20 The Supreme Court declined to countenance the Chancery Court’s 
reasoning regarding regulatory risk. The Court reasoned:
Beyond the reality that prevailing economic theories assume
that markets take information about all sorts of risk,
including regulatory risk into account and price that 
information into the things traded on those markets, the
record reveals that equity analysts, equity buyers, debt
analysts, debt providers and others were in fact attuned
to the regulatory risks facing DFC. For one thing, in the 
years leading up to the merger, DFC’s stock price fluctuated,
but it had an overall downward trend. … 21                                               
[Internal citations omitted.]
        So also, the Supreme Court rejected the Chancery Court’s reasoning about the specific business 
constraints of private equity firms. The Court observed:
[A]ll disciplined buyers, both strategic and financial,
have internal rates of return that they expect in exchange
for taking on the large risk of a merger, or for that matter,
any sizeable investment of its capital. That a buyer
focuses on hitting its internal rate of return has no
rational connection to whether price its pays as a result
of a competitive process is a fair one.22
[Internal citations omitted.]
       The Delaware Supreme Court rejected all the other strands of the reasoning that the Court of 
Chancery had based its decision upon.23 The Supreme Court concluded that “the decision to give one-
third weight to each metric was unexplained and in tension with the Court of Chancery’s own findings 
about the robustness of the market check.”24 On that basis, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded the case to the Court of Chancery for reconsideration of its decision.
20  Id., at internal page 50 of the Court’s Opinion.
21  Id., at internal page 52 of the Court’s Opinion.
22  Id., at internal page 57 of the Court’s Opinion.
23  Significantly, although the Court refused to make a presumption that the deal price embodied fair value, 
the Court observed that “a robust market check will often be the most reliable evidence of fair value…” 
Id. at internal page 39 of the Court’s Opinion.
24  Id., at internal page 85 of the Court’s Opinion.
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　　　5.    Fortis Advisors LLC v. Shire US Holdings, Inc.:25
　　　This case involved a dispute over milestone payments that the plaintiffs alleged to be due under 
a merger agreement. SARcode Bioscience Inc. was acquired by Shire US Holdings, a biopharmaceutical 
company. Under the merger agreement, a part of the consideration was to be paid up front, and further 
milestone payments were payable contingent upon the occurrence of certain conditions relating to a 
drug that SARcode Inc. had been seeking to develop. Fortis Advisors LLC, acting as a representative for 
the former stockholders of SARcode Bioscience Inc. filed the present suit alleging that two milestones 
specified in the agreement had been achieved and thereby defendant Shire US Holdings, Inc. was liable 
to pay $425 million dollars to the plaintiffs. Defendant disputed plaintiffs’ claim and filed a motion for 
dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12 (b)(6) of the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware.
　　　The case principally turned upon the interpretation of the terms of the agreement and is 
significant inasmuch as the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the contract and thereby 
denied the plaintiffs’ claim to the milestone payments even though the defendants had managed to 
successfully develop the drug and obtain FDA approval for it. In its interpretation of the contract, the 
Court relied upon settled principles.26 Viewing the plain words of the contract as being unambiguous, the 
Court concluded that the defendant’s interpretation of the Merger Agreement was the only reasonable 
interpretation, and that the plaintiffs had been unable to advance a reasonable interpretation in support 
of their claim. In doing so, the Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.
　　　6.    In Re MeadWestvaco Stockholders Litigation:27 
　　　This case involved a merger between MeadWestvaco Corporation and Rock-Tenn Company. It 
was a stock-for-stock merger of equals. The merger was approved by MeadWestvaco’s board, which was 
composed of nine directors, eight of whom were outside directors who were indubitably independent 
and disinterested. Merger negotiations between the parties had been carried out between the parties 
intermittently over a period of many months.  The directors were exculpated from personal liability 
25  Fortis Advisors LLC v. Shire US Holdings, Inc. C.A. No. 12147-VCS. Decided by the Court of Chancery of 
the State of Delaware on August 9, 2017. Memorandum Opinion, available at: https://courts.delaware.gov/
Opinions/Download.aspx?id=260560. 
26  The Court set out these settled principles in its Opinion thus:
Questions involving contract interpretation can be answered
as a matter of law on a motion to dismiss “[w]hen the 
language of a contract is plain and unambiguous.” Dismissal
of a contract dispute under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper, however,
“only if the defendants’ interpretation is the only reasonable
construction as a matter of law.” If the Plaintiff has offered
a reasonable construction of the contract, and that construction
supports the claims asserted in the complaint, then the Court
must deny the motion to dismiss even if the defendant’s 
construction is also reasonable. 
[Internal citations omitted.]
Fortis Advisors LLC v. Shire US Holdings, Inc. Id., at internal pages 12 and 13 of the Court’s Opinion. The 
Court cited the following cases in support of these principles: Capital Corp. v. GC Sun Hldgs., L.P., 910 
A.2d 1020, 1030 (Del.Ch.2006); VLIW Tech., LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 840 A.2d 606, 615 (Del.2003); 
and Vanderbilt Income and Growth Assocs., LLC v. Arvida/JMB Managers, Inc . 691 A.2d 609, 613 
(Del.1996).
27  In Re Meadwestvaco Stockholders Litigation. Consolidated C.A. No. 10617-CB. Decided by the Court of 
Chancery of the State of Delaware on August 17, 2017. Memorandum Opinion, available at: https://courts.
delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=260760.
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for breach of the fiduciary duty of care under Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Code by the inclusion 
of a provision to that effect in the certificate of incorporation. MeadWestvaco’s three eminent financial 
advisors were of the opinion that the transaction was fair to the stockholders of the corporation and two 
major proxy advisory firms had recommended that the stockholders vote in support of the merger. Also, 
98% of the MeadWestvaco stockholders had voted in favor of the merger.
     The plaintiffs in the case were stockholders of MeadWestvaco Corporation who alleged that the 
directors had committed breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with the merger, and sought monetary 
damages in the suit. The plaintiffs also asserted a claim for aiding and abetting against Rock-Tenn 
Company. The gravamen of the plaintiffs’ allegation was that MeadWestvaco directors had acted in 
bad faith while entering into the merger and in the process had inflicted substantial loss upon the 
stockholders. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the facts as set out 
in the complaint did not make a sustainable claim for bad faith and further that, in any event, the 
stockholder vote in favor of the merger had a cleansing effect on the transaction.
       Upon determining that business judgment was the presumptive standard for evaluating the decision 
of the board and upon noting the existence of the exculpatory clause, the court reasoned that to sustain 
their claim regarding the directors’ breaches of fiduciary duty, the complaint would have to set out facts 
that led to a reasonable inference that a majority of the directors were not disinterested and independent 
or that the directors had not acted in good faith.28 The Court noted that:
This Court has held on numerous occasions that “to state a
bad-faith claim, a plaintiff must show either [1] an extreme
set of facts to establish that disinterested directors were
intentionally disregarding their duties or [2] that the 
decision under attack is so far beyond the bounds of reasonable
judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any 
ground other than bad faith.”29
[Internal citation omitted.]
       Upon a detailed consideration of the facts of the case as pled in the Complaint, the Court concluded 
that neither could it be reasonably inferred therefrom that the MeadWestvaco directors had committed 
breaches of their fiduciary duty regarding oversight, nor that they had acted in bad faith. The Court 
also determined that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim for aiding and abetting against Rock-Tenn 
Company. On that basis, the Court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss.
　　　7.    GreenStar IH Rep, LLC v. Tutor Perini Corp.:30 
　　　This case arose out of a transaction whereby Tutor Perini Corporation (Tutor Perini) acquired 
Greenstar Services Corporation (Greenstar) in 2011. The merger agreement provided for earn-out 
payments that were to be made by Tutor Perini to Greenstar Interest Holder Representative for five 
28  Id., at internal page 14 of the Court’s Opinion. The Court, here, relied upon BJ’s Wholesale Club, 2013 WL 
396202.
29  Id., at internal pages 15 and 16 of the Court’s Opinion. The Court, here, relied upon and cited In re Chel-
sea Therapeutics International Ltd. Stockholders Litigation, 2016 WL 3044721, at *7 (Del. Ch. May 20, 
2016); Dent v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., 2014 WL 2931180, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2014); BJ’s Wholesale Club, 
2013 WL 396202, at *7; and In Re Alloy, Inc. 2011 WL 4863716, at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 2011).
30  GreenStar IH Rep, LLC v. Tutor Perini Corp. C.A. No.12885-VCS. Decided by the Court of Chancery of the 
State of Delaware on October 31, 2017. Memorandum Opinion, available at: https://courts.delaware.gov/
Opinions/Download.aspx?id=264040. 
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one-year terms upon the achievement of certain specified milestones. After making the requisite 
earnout payments in the first two years after closing, Tutor Perini refused to make further payments 
in subsequent years. Greenstar Interest Holder Representative brought suit against Tutor Perini for 
damages for the non-payment of earnout dues for the third, fourth, and fifth years. 
In addition to making certain affirmative defenses, Tutor Perini also filed a counter-claim against the 
former CEO of Greenstar who was also an Interest Holder, contending that he had furnished false 
information that had resulted in inflated payments for the first two years. 
        Greenstar Interest Holder Representative filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in respect 
of three counts of the complaint and the former CEO of Greenstar filed a motion to dismiss the 
counterclaims. The Delaware Court of Chancery interpreted the merger agreement as being unambiguous 
regarding the mode and manner in which the earn-out payments were to be calculated and made and 
held that as a matter of law it was incumbent upon Tutor Perini to make the earn-out payments for the 
subsequent years as claimed by Greenstar Interest Holder Representative. The Court also held that in 
light of the fact that the contractual language clearly spelled out the intention of the parties, the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing could not be availed of by Tutor Perini to read in terms which could 
well have been embodied in  the merger agreement when it was drafted. Further, regarding Tutor Perini’s 
allegation about the former CEO having furnished false information, the Court held that the pleadings 
did not measure up to the level of particularity required to sustain an allegation of fraud.
        On that basis, the Court granted Greenstar Interest Holder Representative’s motion in respect of 
three counts of the complaint and also granted the motion to dismiss the counterclaim filed by Greenstar’s 
former CEO in respect of two counts of the counterclaim. 
　　　8.  van der Fluit v. Yates:31 
　　　This case related to the acquisition of Opower, Inc. by Oracle Corporation. The transaction was 
in the form of a two-step merger.32 Plaintiff was a stockholder of Opower, Inc. who filed the present 
suit against the directors of Opower, Inc. alleging breaches of fiduciary duties, and an aiding and 
abetting claim against Oracle Corporation. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff contended 
that the appropriate standard of review was either entire fairness or enhanced scrutiny because, the 
transaction was allegedly engineered by a controlling stockholder, and that it was not approved by an 
independent majority of the members of the board of directors. Alternatively, the plaintiff contended 
that the defendants had breached their Revlon duties.33 Defendants contended that there was no 
controlling shareholder and that a fully informed, uncoerced majority of the shareholders had approved 
the transaction. Therefore, the defendants argued, the business judgment rule applied.34 Furthermore, 
31van der Fluit v. Yates. C.A. No. 12553-VCMR. Decided by the Court of Chancery of 
   the Court of Delaware on November 30, 2017. Memorandum Opinion, available at: https://courts.delaware.
   gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=265870. 
32  A mode of acquisition through a combination of a tender offer and a back-end merger. 
    It is provided for under Section 251 (h) of the Delaware General Corporation Law.
33  See: Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.1986). The Delaware Supreme 
Court here held that in cases involving the sale or break-up of a company, the fiduciary duty of the board 
was to ensure “the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit,” (506 A.2d 
173, at 182) and that the directors were to act as “auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the 
stockholders at a sale of the company.” (506 A.2d 173, at 182).  
34  The defendants relied upon Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (2015). The Delaware 
Supreme Court here affirmed the Delaware Court of Chancery’s holding that “the business judgment rule 
is invoked as the appropriate standard of review for a post-closing damages action when a merger that 
is not subject to the entire fairness standard of review has been approved by a fully informed, uncoerced 
majority of the disinterested stockholders.” Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (2015) 
at 305-306. The holding in Corwin  was later clarified by the Delaware Court of Chancery as being appli-
50 Nitin Datar
the defendants contended that in any event, defendants had not made any allegations of breaches of non-
exculpated fiduciary duties by the directors, nor had they pleaded any allegations of fact that showed any 
aiding and abetting by Oracle.
        The Court found that although the plaintiff had not sufficiently pleaded the existence of a controlling 
stockholder, defendants were not entitled to the benefit of the presumed application of the business 
judgment rule under Corwin because the pleadings contained adequate allegations of fact to indicate 
that there had been important omissions in the offer disclosures resulting in the stockholders’ vote not 
being fully informed. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the pleadings did not adequately state non-
exculpated breaches of the duty of loyalty by the board of directors, and also did not state an aiding and 
abetting claim against Oracle. 
        On that basis, the Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint. 
　　　9.   IRA Trust FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane:35 
　　　This case related to the share reclassification of NRG Yield, Inc., a corporation with  
a controlling stockholder, NRG Energy, Inc. NRG Energy, Inc. had been in control of NRG Yield, Inc. 
since its inception but over the years had had a decline in its voting power due to the issuance of new 
shares for the purpose of financing asset acquisitions. Being concerned about losing control, NRG Energy, 
Inc. proposed that NRG Yield, Inc. reclassify its capital structure by issuing new classes of stock on a 
proportionate basis with diminished voting rights in order to finance further asset acquisitions. One effect 
of such a reclassification would be to ensure NRG Energy, Inc.’s continued control of NRG Yield, Inc. The 
proposal was subjected to approval by a special independent  committee and a vote by a majority of the 
minority stockholders. Both conditions were duly fulfilled. 
        One class of stockholders of NRG Yield, Inc. filed suit claiming breaches of fiduciary duties on the 
part of directors of NRG Yield, Inc. in approving the transaction and on the part of NRG Energy, Inc. in 
causing the transaction to be made by NRG Yield, Inc. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. 
        At the outset, the Court formulated the issues to be resolved at the motion stage thus:
(1)Is the Reclassification a conflicted transaction subject
to entire fairness review even though it nominally involved
a pro rata distribution of shares? (2) If so, should the 
analytical framework articulated in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide
Corp., a squeeze-ourt merger case, apply to the Reclassification?
(3)If so, has that framework been satisfied in this case from 
the face of the pleadings?36
(Internal citation omitted)
          The Court answered all the issues in the affirmative. In the first place, the Court found that due to 
cable to cases where a controlling stockholder had not derived a personal benefit (In re Merge Healthcare 
Inc., 2017 WL 395981 (Del.Ch.Jan.30, 2017)), and barring a showing of waste, once it is determined that 
the business judgment rule is applicable, a dismissal of the claims ensues (Singh v. Attenborough, 137 
A.3d 151 (Del.2016)). The application of the Corwin rule was further extended to first step tender offers 
under Section 251 (h) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (In Re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litiga-
tion, 143 A.3d 727 (Del.Ch.2016))
35  IRA Trust FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane. Consolidated C.A.No.12742-CB. Decided by 
  the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware on December 11, 2017. Opinion, available at: https://courts.
delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=266400. 
36  Id., at internal page 3 of the Court’s Opinion.
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the fact that NRG Yield, Inc. derived the benefit of continuing its control of NRG Energy, Inc., which was 
something unique to NRG Energy, Inc. vis-à-vis the other stockholders, the share reclassification was a 
conflicted controller transaction. The Court, however, held that the framework set out by the Delaware 
Supreme Court in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp. was applicable in this case.37 Upon a review of the 
cases in which the Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp. framework had been applied in various controller 
transactions, the Court concluded that the reasoning in those cases was equally relevant in the present 
case.38 Finally, the Court considered whether the pre-requisites for the application of the business 
judgment standard as postulated by the Delaware Supreme Court in the M&F Worldwide case had been 
duly fulfilled.39 Plaintiff ’s principal contention was that the vote of the minority in the present case was 
not informed as it was based upon disclosure violations in the proxy. Upon a detailed consideration of the 
plaintiff ’s contentions, the Court concluded that they lacked merit and that the pre-conditions as set out 
by the Delaware Supreme Court in M&F Worldwide  had been duly fulfilled. Consequently, the Court held 
that the applicable standard of review was the deferential business judgment standard and not entire 
fairness. On that basis, the Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint.  
　　　10.   Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., et al.:40
　　　This was an appeal before the Delaware Supreme Court from a 2016 decision of the Delaware 
Court of Chancery. This case arose in connection with an appraisal demand under Section 262 of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law made by former stockholders of Dell Inc. pursuant to a management-
led buyout. The merger consideration was $13.75 per share, which was 37% higher than the 90-day 
average stock price. In a post-trial ruling, the Delaware Court of Chancery appraised the fair value of the 
shares at $17.62 in spite of the buyout process having been robust. Disregarding both the deal price and 
the stock price, the Court of Chancery arrived at this figure, which was close to 30% above the deal price, 
by utilizing its own discounted cash flow analysis to compute the fair value of the shares. The Court of 
Chancery had founded its analyses principally on the bases that there had been a valuation difference 
between the stock price and its intrinsic value, that there had been only financial rather than strategic 
bidders, and that there were allegedly structural problems in management-led buyouts.
      On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court took issue with the reasoning of the Court of Chancery, 
finding it to be flawed and dissonant with the Court of Chancery’s own findings of fact.41 The Supreme 
Court rejected the principal bases for the Court of Chancery’s analysis and, given the facts of the case, 
37  Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88A.3d 635 (Del.2014). In this case, the Delaware Supreme Court had held 
that going-private mergers should be reviewed by the business judgment standard provide they are condi-
tioned upon two procedural devices, namely: “approval of an independent, adequately-empowered Special 
Committee that fulfills its duty of care; and the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority 
stockholders.” Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88A.3d 635 (Del.2014), at 644.    
38  Supra note 35, at internal pages 25 to 32 of the Court’s Opinion The underlying rationale, according 
to the Court, was that adherence to the MFW framework caused the transaction to be a result of “an 
arm’s-length bargaining process.” Supra note 35 at internal page 29 of the Court’s Opinion.
39  The pre-requisites for the application of the business judgment standard as set out by the Delaware 
Supreme Court are enumerated in Supra, note 37.
40  Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., et al .  No.565, 2016. Consolidated 
C.A.No.9322-VCL. Decided by the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware on December 14, 2017. Opin-
ion, available at: https://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=266610. 
41  Id., at internal pages 38 to 65 of the Court’s Opinion. The Supreme Court, inter alia, referred to the 
“efficient market hypothesis,” which, in the words of the Court, “teaches that the price produced by an 
efficient market is generally a more reliable assessment of fair value than the view of a single analyst, 
especially an expert witness who caters her valuation to the litigation imperatives of a well-heeled 
client.” (Internal citation omitted.) (Id., at internal page 40 of the Court’s Opinion.)
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asserted the importance of market evidence as an accurate indicator of fair value.42 After dealing with 
related issues concerning taxes, expenses, and fees, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed in part the 
ruling of the Delaware Court of Chancery and remanded for further proceedings.
　　　11.   Mark Lavin v. West Corporation:43 
　　　This case arose in connection with the merger of West Corporation with affiliates of Apollo Global 
Management. A preponderant majority of West Corporation’s shares voted in favor of the merger. Plaintiff 
was a stockholder of West Corporation. Plaintiff made an inspection-of-books-and-records demand 
under Section 220 of the DGCL44 for the stated purpose of examining the propriety of various aspects 
of the merger. West Corporation refused to accede to the demand on the grounds that the demand was 
too wide and that it was not restricted to a legitimate purpose. Plaintiff filed the present suit against 
West Corporation to compel inspection. In justifying its refusal, West Corporation, inter alia, relied 
on the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC,45 contending 
that the merger had been cleansed by the vote of “a majority of disinterested, informed, and uncoerced 
stockholders.”46 The Court found that the plaintiff had presented evidence that constituted a “credible 
basis”47 for sustaining a claim of impropriety, and that the plaintiff had sought the books and records for 
a legitimate purpose. The Court further held that Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC could not be 
invoked at this stage to deny the plaintiff his Section 220 right. On that basis, the Court ruled in favor of 
the plaintiff.
        III.Conclusion:
      In sum, M&A litigation in Delaware Courts in the second half of 2017 related to an array of 
issues, and there were significant developments in the continuing evolution of the Delaware Courts’ 
jurisprudence regarding M&A transactions. Three of the more  prominent developments were: (i) The 
Delaware Supreme Court’s reversal and remand of the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decisions in DFC 
42  The Court did, however, hold back from stating that market evidence should in all cases be decisive in de-
termining fair value. Specifically, the Supreme Court stated:
In so holding, we are not saying that the market is always
the best indicator of value, or that it should always be 
granted some weight. We only note that, when the evidence
of market efficiency, fair play, low barriers to entry, outreach 
to all logical buyers, and the chance for any topping bidder to
have the support of Mr. Dell’s own votes is so compelling, then
failure to give the resulting price heavy weight because the 
trial judge believes there was mispricing missed by all the Dell
stockholders, analysts, and potential buyers abuses even the
wide discretion afforded the Court of Chancery in these 
difficult cases. 
　  Id., at internal page 60 of the Court’s Opinion. 
43  Mark Lavin v. West Corporation. C.A. No. 2017-0547-JRS. Decided by the Court of Chancery of the 
State of Delaware on December 29, 2017. Opinion, available at: https://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/
Download.aspx?id=267230.  
44  Supra note 17.
45  Supra, note 5.
46  Supra note 43, at internal page 16 of the Court’s Opinion.
47  Supra note 43, at internal page 17 of the Court’s Opinion.
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Global Corporation v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., et al.48 and Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event 
Driven Master Fund Ltd., et al.49 provide valuable guidance on the right valuation methods to be used in 
statutory appraisal actions; (ii) In Salberg v. Genworth Financial, Inc.,50 the Delaware Court of Chancery 
dealt with the issue of the applicability of the Garner doctrine to a stockholder demand for inspection of 
books and records under Section 220 of the DGCL; and (iii) The Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision 
in In re Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation 51 highlighted the importance 
of adherence to the procedural framework laid down by the Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn v. M&F 
Worldwide.
    The spurt in the filing of disclosure-only lawsuits in the U.S. Federal Courts during 201752 and other 
developments notwithstanding, the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court retain 
their reputational primacy as the leading courts in the United States in matters relating to corporate 
litigation.
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